supplied by instantaneous spaces and a relational time (Stein [1967] ). Thus the pendulum has begun to swing the other way, and Earman in particular has argued that spacetime must be granted full reality (see especially his latest treatment in Earman [1989] ).
But here I want to give the pendulum a push in a different direction. For I am not fully in sympathy with either of the two extremes of its swing just described: neither the positivist view which sees space as being defined relative to a given observable body (Mach, Reichenbach, and, in some moods, Einstein), nor the realist view that the spacetime structure is ontologically prior to material bodies. Rather, I want to point out that the usual way of opposing the views of Newton and Leibniz seriously distorts their views on both space and relativity. The reading of Newton's 'relative space' as a global reference frame obscures his complete opposition to the relativity of motions, even inertial ones; whereas the usual reading of Leibniz as defining space in terms of relations among perduring bodies obscures the fact that his relative space is strictly instantaneous, and misrepresents his conception of true motion. A more accurate rendering of the opposition between them, I argue, leads to a wholly different understanding of Leibniz's theory of space, one which is not susceptible to the objections Newton had raised against Descartes. This in turn suggests a new approach for contemporary theory of space, one which neither hypostatizes space nor tries to reduce it to relations among actual things.
NEWTON ON SPACE AND RELATIVITY
According to the usual view, Newton was almost right about the relativity of motion and the nature of space. His mechanics embodies an equivalence of inertial frames; that is, the laws of Newtonian physics are the same in all inertial reference frames, or invariant under a transformation from one frame to another. This fact, it is said, is duly recognized by Newton in Corollary V to the Laws of Motion in the Principia:
The motions of bodies included in a given space are the same among themselves, whether that space is at rest, or moves uniformly forward in a straight line without any circular motion. (Newton [1726] , p. 63; my translation) Notoriously, however, Newton went on to claim that one of these spaces is absolutely at rest, namely absolute space. His famous argument at the end of the Scholium concerning the rotating bucket is usually interpreted as an attempt to provide a criterion (at least for the case of circular motion) for absolute motion or rest. Again, from a modern perspective, Newton's intuitions are on track. For the absoluteness of circular motion-as opposed to linearly accelerated motion-is preserved not only in the Special Theory of Relativity, but also in the General Theory, in spite of Einstein's expectations-a point that is not always appreciated.
Where Newton erred, however, according to this modern perspective, was in generalizing from the case of circular motion to all motion: in assuming that finding a criterion for absolute circular motion is sufficient to establish absolute motion generally. But all that is necessary for the absoluteness of a circular motion is an absolute velocity difference, not an absolute velocity.2 A simple example should help to clarify this point. Imagine a bicycle travelling at a speed v along a straight, level road, taken to be at rest. At a given moment the top of the wheel will be moving with a speed 2v with respect to the point of contact between wheel and road directly beneath it. Now consider the same situation from a different frame of reference, namely one in which the bicycle is considered to be at rest. Now the road will be slipping away under the bicycle in a straight line with a velocity -v, and the point at the top of the wheel will have a velocity of + v. Thus the velocity difference between the top and bottom of the wheel will still be 2v, and the wheel will still be rotating in the new inertial frame at the same angular velocity (namely, vlr, if r is the radius of the wheel). Clearly this argument will work (in classical mechanics) for any linear change of velocity; that is, the circular motion is the same in any inertial frame. Thus Newton's dynamical argument does not succeed in establishing a unique rest frame, but an infinite family of inertial frames.
This modern perspective on Newton's views about space and relativity is clearly beyond reproach as an interpretation of Newtonian mechanics as it is understood today. But the further questions arise concerning its adequacy as a historical account of Newton's own position, and the extent to which he did anticipate modern views on spactime. And from this perspective, I shall argue, it is a reading of Newton through very modern spectacles-a distortion through the lens of anachronism, one might say. The real, historical Newton is closer (especially in his early writings) to an Aristotelian (!) perspective than we are comfortable admitting.
In the first place, there is already a distortion of Newton's position in interpreting his 'relative spaces' as reference frames, and in interpreting his absolute space as a specially distinguished relative space.3 What Newton had in mind when he spoke of relative space was what he called a 'movable dimension' of space, defined by reference to certain bodies; that is, a region of space, like the sublunar space, or to give a more modern example, the stratosphere. This is clear from his discussion in the Principia:
Absolute space, by its own nature without relation to anything external, always remains similar and immobile. Relative space is any mobile measure or dimension of it, which is defined by our senses through its situation with respect to bodies, and is commonly taken for immobile space: such as the dimension of a subterraneous, an aerial or a celestial space, defined by its situation with respect to the earth. Absolute and relative space are the same in figure and magnitude; but they do not remain always numerically the same. For if the earth, for example, moved, the space of our air, which relatively and in respect of the earth always remains the same, would at one time be one part of the absolute space into which the air passes, and at another time a different part of it; and thus absolutely would be perpetually changed. (Newton [1726] , pp. 46-7; my translation)
Here there is no question of an infinite class of equivalent frames, each adequate to the coordinatization of the whole infinite space, and one of which is privileged as absolute. Rather, Newton is asking us to envisage one fixed, immobile reference space, through which various bodies are moving, and along with them, certain delimited spaces defined with respect to them. A relative space is thus a delimited region of space, rather than an infinite frame, and is determined by the situation or position of surrounding bodies, which are themselves situated in immobile, absolute space.
This rendering leads to a reconsideration of what Newton says about the relativity of motion. For if relative spaces are not reference frames, how could Newton have anticipated the Galilean relativity we recognize in his mechanics today? I shall argue that careful attention to his words shows that he did not, and that this is a consequence of the fact that he did not have a modern 'Newtonian' conception of the relationship between force and motion.
For, despite his commitment to the principle of rectilinear inertia, Newton consistently held in his early writings on dynamics that force is necessary to produce motion, and only gradually and incompletely emancipated himself from this conception. To a modern ear, this sounds like a contradiction, since inertial motion is motion that takes place in the absence of any forces. But Newton did not initially abide by this Cartesian conception. In the (untitled and unpublished) anti-Cartesian polemic he wrote prior to the Principia (in about 1669, or possibly later), now usually known by its opening words 'De Def 5. Force is the causal principle of motion and rest. And it is either an external one which generates or destroys, or at least in some way changes, the motion impressed in a body; or it is an internal principle by which motion or rest imparted5 to the body is conserved, and by which any being whatever endeavours to persevere in its state and resists being impeded.
Although by the time the Principia was printed in 1687 Newton had 'cleaned up' his definitions somewhat, this dual conception of force was instrumental to his solving of many principal theorems and problems of the Principia, and persists in his wording of them. In Theorem 1, for instance, a body is said to describe a right line 'by its innate force', and this conception of inertia as an internal force, with external forces like gravity producing changes of this internal force, is essential to his understanding of the Parallelogram Law." Thus in Proposition 1, Newton's proof of the Area Law, the time is divided into equal (small yet finite) parts, and the centripetal force is represented as the summation of a series of discrete impulses towards the centre, separated by these intervals. The resulting motion in each part of time is the composition of two motions, the one resulting from the innate force the body already possesses acting throughout that time, which is proportional to the body's velocity, the other resulting from the internal force that it would have acquired from the action of the external force alone, which is thus proportional to the change of the body's velocity. (The continuity of centripetal force is then recovered by increasing the number of such compositions and decreasing their temporal separations without limit.)7
Now this conception of inertia as a force of the body's motion was deliberately constructed by Newton to counter the doctrine of the relativity of motion. In 'De Gravitatione' his target is Descartes, from whose relativist doctrine of motion it follows 'that motion can be generated when no force is impressed' and 'that God himself could not generate motion in some bodies even though he impelled them with the greatest force' (Hall and Hall [1962] , pp. 95, 127). On the contrary, Newton explains in the Scholium to his definitions, 'True motion is neither generated nor altered except by forces impressed upon the body moved; whereas relative motion may be generated and altered without forces being impressed upon that body' (Newton [1726] , p. 50).
From this position it follows that there would be a real difference between the whole universe's being at rest and its moving inertially, contrary to the relationists' doctrine. This is explicitly advocated by Samuel Clarke (speaking for Newton) in his controversy with Leibniz The modern reader is, I think, apt to side with Leibniz here: there would not indeed be any discernible difference between our universe and one moving inertially relative to it. But Leibniz is making the far stronger-and factually false!-claim that there would be no distinction between ours and another universe in any kind of motion relative to it; and although Clarke's reductio fails as a rebuttal of this claim, had he followed Newton's lead in appealing to the case of rotational motion, his argument would have been perfectly sound. For the premise he is attacking is Leibniz's assumption of the principle of the universal relativity of motion, according to which any body, even a circularly accelerated one,8 can be considered as at rest without any change in the phenomena, and Newton's example of the centrifugal tendencies observable in rotating matter quite correctly demonstrates the absurdity of this position. Thus Newton is much cannier than Leibniz or Clarke on this point. Although he maintained the absoluteness not just of accelerated motion, but of inertial motion too, he was careful never to claim that inertial motion could be directly empirically distinguished from rest in absolute space. This, of course, is one of the reasons he is read as upholding the (Galilean) relativity of inertial motions in the Fifth Corollary to his Laws of Motion, as mentioned above. But does he? Recall that the corollary reads:
The motions of bodies included in a given space are the same among themselves, whether that space is at rest, or moves uniformly forward in a straight line without any circular motion. (Newton [1726] , p. 63) What he says is that these bodies' motions 'are the same among themselves', i.e. their relative motions remain the same, whether their space is moving inertially or at rest. But this does not alter the fact that the true motions of these bodies will be different in the two cases, since it would require a force to move these bodies and their accompanying relative space from rest to a given velocity in absolute space. Such a difference is evident, for instance, in the putative universe considered above, where God creates everything in it moving forward in a straight line. No experiment can be devised to show this uniform increment in 'innate force'; however, the difference between God's having expended such a vast force and his not having done so is for Newton perfectly real; no less real in the case of linear motion than in that of circular motion, even if not directly empirically determinable.
Thus there is no Galilean equivalence of inertial motions in Corollary V: true rest is really different from true motion. What Newton is asserting there (and in Corollary VI) is rather that the mutual motions of all the bodies contained in a given relative space-all the velocity differences at any instant-will remain the same even when the space and all the bodies contained in it are or have been accelerated in parallel lines by the same amount.9 So there is no reason to assume that the mature Newton would not have fully agreed with his earlier assesment in 'De Gravitatione' of the Cartesian claim that 'no one motion can be said to be true, absolute and proper in preference to others, but that all, whether with respect to contiguous bodies or remote ones, are equally philosophical': this, he wrote, was a claim 'nothing more absurd than which could be imagined' (Hall and Hall [1962] , pp. 95, 127).
So from a modern 'Newtonian' point of view, Newton is clearly criticizable on this account. His positing of an absolute space at rest is a holdover from a But there is another sense in which Newton's insight is claimed to support that concept. For Stein and others have claimed that his critique validly demonstrates the necessity of positing the four-dimensional affine structure of spacetime, the 'kinematical connection', as a really existing structure over and above whatever structure is necessary for instantaneous spaces and time; that 'this is the "immobile being" that Newton says is required' ([1967] , p. 187); and therefore that any theory that defines space 'in terms simply of the spatial relations of bodies' will be inadequate to this task. Now I submit that this is a curiously strong conclusion, and deserves to be treated with some suspicion. Suppose we put Descartes's inconsistent definitions of motion and place to one side, and still insist that place should be defined with respect to bodies rather than a pre-existing space. What is there in Newton's argument to tell us that this is wrong? Well, Newton says that bodies are always in motion, so that if the initial starting place of the motion of body B is defined with respect to some body or system of bodies A, then since A is itself moving, the start of B's trajectory will have changed by the time B has moved anywhere. But if we are defining place with respect to the body A, hypothesized to be at rest, then, by definition, A itself always remains in the same place! Newton can only claim that A is moving by surreptitiously smuggling in his absolute space as a reference space for that motion: his argument is a petitio principii! Of course, there still remains the objection raised by Stein that in constructing a spacetime adequate to the description of motion we need the kinematical connection in addition to instantaneous relational spaces. But are we obliged to adopt Newton's ontological interpretation of this mathematical structure? Here I think we are all too liable to be lulled into a certain complacency about the idea of an enduring substantival space by our familiarity with the spacetime of General Relativity, whose metric is capable of 'interacting' with matter-energy fields. But we can perhaps gain clarity even on that issue by examining the problem of the ontological status of space in its purely seventeenth-century context. Now I ask, isn't it a bit curious how Newton's critique of Descartes is supposed to convince us of the necessity of positing this kinematical connection as an existing spacetime structure, rather than something deriving from the nature of bodies?
Newton, of course, has his own metaphysical reasons for having this structure primarily in space and time, and only derivatively in bodies. According to him, absolute space and time are prior to all created things, the universe having been created by God by an act of will at a definite time and place. Absolute space, moreover, is replete with structure, even in the absence of things: in it, he claims, These remarks lead to the following consideration. (The mature) Leibniz does not at all accept the primacy of space over bodies: for him space is rather an abstraction from the relations of bodies, as it is for Hobbes. But as is well known, bodies themselves are not primary for Leibniz, but are the 'results' of monads. Now a monad is defined by Leibniz as a simple substance that remains self-identical through time; it has an infinite series of states or perceptions, and a primitive force or appetition which takes each of these states into the next in the series; that is, at every moment it has not only a well-defined state, but a state of change, what Leibniz calls a 'monadic conatus'. Thus if we are to persist in reading Newton through the eyes of modern differential geometry, we could at least afford the same compliment to Leibniz. From this perspective a monad is afibre bundle: in addition to the one-dimensional manifold of states, we have for every state something analogous to the derivative, a monadic state of change, which is, formally, a tangent space-so that, mathematically speaking, the monad is a tangent bundle. That is, assuming the state of a monad contains all the information necessary for locating its body in space and time,1W the kinematic connection necessary for the representation of motion is in a certain sense contained in the very rich monadic structure within each body. Now, whether or not we regard this as a reasonable interpretation of Leibniz's intent, it at least suggests that the kinematical connection of spacetime may not be primitive, but may rather have its origin in the laws governing the relations of bodies.
RELATIVE SPACE AND ABSOLUTE MOTION IN LEIBNIZ
This brings us to a consideration of Leibniz's views on space and relativity. As I have explained elsewhere [1988] , I believe Leibniz's concept of relative space to be quite different from the one usually attributed to him. I cannot go into details here, but I can give some indication of the unappreciated originality of his views by examining where he stands on the issues discussed above. In particular, I want to examine whether Leibniz's stated theory of space and place is susceptible to Newton's objections, and whether Stein is correct in claiming that any such relational theory is inadequate to the description of motion.
On the usual interpretation of his position, Leibniz held location in space to be relative to some actually existing reference body or bodies, and space to be a system of such relations-a reading I shall dub 'actual-body relationalism'." Now, it must be admitted, this interpretation seems natural enough given Leibniz's unequivocal commitment to the universal relativity of motion ('equipollence of hypotheses') mentioned above. This is because the body or system of bodies that defines zero velocity-e.g. in the case of Mach, the fixed stars-will generally also be the reference system defining the space. Note, however-this will be important in what follows-that when Leibniz's relative space is so interpreted as a space defined relative to actual bodies at rest or in motion, the space will be a perduring one, since the system of relations will endure through time along with the bodies as long as these bodies continue to exist.
On Exactly what Leibniz does mean by his criterion for absolute motion is a matter of some controversy. What he says here appears to connect it closely with his philosophy of causation. In most cases of mutual motion, we can determine the cause. If I run towards you, we both experience a change in our relative situation. But the cause lies in me and my actions, and not in the merely extrinsic change of your situation relative to me. Thus I am in motion, and not you. Similarly, if I travel in Galileo's boat, whose uniform motion leaves no trace in the phenomena observable in its cabin, the most intelligible hypothesis is still that the cause of the motion of the boat relative to the sea is to be found in the full sails of the boat due to the action of the wind, and not in the action of the wind upon the sea. So the boat is truly said to be moving, and not the sea. But I am more interested here in Leibniz's second admission to Clarke. For I think it shows that there is something wrong with the usual presentation of Leibniz as an actual-body relativist-one who holds that space is a set of relations to some perduring actual body. And this gives a very different perspective from the usual one on Leibniz's philosophy of space: what he presents is not, I claim, a simple rejection of absolute space in favour of a space relative to actual bodies, but something a good deal more subtle.
In the first place, Leibniz is in complete agreement with Newton's analysis of the consequences of motion in a Cartesian plenum. Indeed, in this respect he is more Cartesian than Descartes, claiming that it follows from the latter's argument for the possibility of motion in a plenum that not just some, but every part of matter is actually subdivided into parts differently moved'. Consequently, because of the constant collisions of all the various bodies and particles in this plenum 'there is never any true rest in bodies'.'4 It therefore follows that, just as Newton proposed, no two bodies are strictly speaking at rest even relatively, that is with respect to one another, 'for no body preserves exactly the same distance from another no matter how short the time elapsed'. Thus a space defined by distances and positions relative to a given actual body can last no longer than an instant. This also follows explicitly from Leibniz's definitions. As he writes in The Monadology and elsewhere, every created being is continuously changing its relations to all others, so that at every instant its state will comprise different relations of situation to them. This, however, is only half the story. For if Leibniz's relative space is merely an evanescent phenomenon, then it is not a framework within which motion can be represented. Here Newton's modern defenders will object that, provided we agree that motion is real, then we are obliged to admit the reality of the space in which that motion is represented. It is here, I think, that some of Leibniz's most original remarks have not been appreciated at all.
For Leibniz does not admit the reality of motion in the required sense: he was too impressed by the implications of the universal relativity of motion. This is clear from some of the fragmentary jottings he made in his first decade at the court in Hanover (1676-86). If, he reasoned (in one of these dated February 1677), all motion is relative, and any body can equally well be regarded as at rest provided concomitant changes are made to the motions of all the others, then motion is more properly regarded as a property of the whole world than of the particular bodies in it.16 It is the harmony among the various points of view that constitutes what is real in motion (we might say it is the transformations between equivalent frames of reference, Galilean, Lorentzian, etc.), together with whatever is responsible for the changes within each one:
And just as colour and sound are phenomena, rather than true attributes of things which contain some absolute nature without respect to us; so too are Absolute space is no more a thing than time is, even though it is pleasing to the imagination; indeed, it can be demonstrated that they are not real things, but are both merely relations of the mind to intelligible hypotheses, i.e. hypotheses for uniform motion and for trying to recover immobile places; and for deducing values from them. And indeed every single substance is a force of acting, or an endeavour to undergo change with respect to all the others according to certain laws of its own nature. Whence every substance expresses the whole universe, according to its own point of view. And in the phenomena of motion this effect is especially apparent, since every single body that one posits there must have a motion in common with some other, as if they were in the same ship, and each one's motion [is] the reciprocal of its bulk; how this could be so could not be imagined if motions were absolute and every single body did not express all others. ('Motion is not something Absolute', 1686?; Arthur n.d.) [1989] , p. 131), but to an endeavour or conatus to change state that takes a substance through its own individual series of states. That is, within every body (more precisely, within the substances producing the appearance of the extended body), there is a principle of change together with a kind of blueprint, a blueprint which dictates the relations the body has through time with all the other bodies, including the laws of motion (conservation of 'bulk' x velocity, and of vis viva) governing how it interacts with them on collision. Now in order to represent these motions, we need to conceive them in a space. But this for Leibniz is a mathematical space, not a really existing entity. Absolute space is the space we feign to ourselves in which certain reference bodies (usually ourselves) are at rest, and in which we calculate the motions of all others on this hypothesis. Of the various possible hypotheses as to what is at rest, one will be more intelligible than all the others, and it is this most intelligible hypothesis that dictates which of the various phenomenal motions we dignify as 'absolute'. But, rigorously speaking, nothing is motionless, and everything changes continuously and mutually in accordance with the various 'rules' and laws that constitute the pre-established harmony.
Thus when Leibniz says that what is real in motion is 'force', he is not referring to the phenomenally manifested vis viva (contra Earman
Before leaving this subject, it is worth noting that there is another important difference for Leibniz between space relative to bodies and Newton's mathematical space. This is that absolute, mathematical space is continuous, whereas space as an instantaneous system of relations is not. And since, according to Leibniz's analysis of the problems of the continuum, no continuous quantity can be real, this corresponds to a third major source of arguments in Leibniz's arsenal against the reality of absolute space, in addition to the argument from the feigned character of absolute motion just discussed, and the famous argument from the identity of indiscernibles in his Third Paper to Clarke.'8 I have explained this at some length elsewhere ([1986, 1989] ).
LEIBNIZ AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE
The above subtleties in Leibniz's position would not have been evident to Newton, unfortunately, for whom his rival's characterization of space as the order of simultaneously existing things was not obviously different from Descartes's. Indeed, inasmuch as it seemed to make space depend ultimately on the relative situations of bodies, as did Descartes's definition of place, it probably appeared to him as another instance of Leibniz's tendency to take other people's doctrines and pass them off as his own by using fancy new terminology of his own invention.
At any rate, Newton interpreted Leibniz as an actual-body relativist, and when we turn back to Leibniz's exchange with Clarke, it is no surprise to find the latter representing Leibniz's definition of space as 'merely the order of bodies', and attacking it on this basis. According to that notion, he says, 'if the earth and sun and moon had been placed where the remotest fixed stars now are, provided they were placed in the same order and distance they now are with regard one to another ... they would then have been in the same place too as they are now, which is an express contradiction' (Clarke's Third Reply, There he begins by defining the situation or distance of a number of coexisting things as 'a certain order of coexistence, according to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less simple'; what this amounts to, in effect (assuming the success of the definitions of his Analysis Situs), is that the situation of a body is defined by the angles and distances it makes with a number of other coexisting things (see my [1986, 1988] 
703)
This, obviously, is in complete agreement with what was said above concerning the feigned character of absolute space and motion. At any instant all bodies in the universe will stand in certain relations of situation to each other, but these relations (being individual accidents of the things concerned) will change from one instant to the next. We therefore suppose (counterfactually, given Leibniz's claim that no body is truly at rest) that some bodies remain in a fixed relation of situation: that they maintain the same angles and distances from each other. Now any two bodies having the same situation to these at different times are said to be in the same place. And here it may not be amiss to consider the difference between place and the relation of situation of the body that fills up the place. For the place of A and B is the same, whereas the relation of A to the fixed bodies is not precisely and individually the same as the relation which B (that comes into its place) will have to the same fixed bodies; but these relations agree only. For two different subjects, as A and B, cannot have the same individual affection, it being impossible that the same individual accident should be in two subjects or pass from one subject to another. But the mind, not contented with agreement, looks for an identity, for something that should be truly the same, and conceives it as being extrinsic to these subjects; and this is what we here call place and space. But this can only be an ideal thing, containing a certain order, wherein the mind conceives the application of relations. Lastly, I observe that the traces of movable bodies, which they sometimes leave upon the immovable ones on which they exercise their movement, have given men occasion to form in their imagination this idea, as if some trace did still remain, even when there is nothing unmoved. But this is a mere ideal thing and imports only that if there were any unmoved thing there, the trace might be marked out upon it. And it is this analogy which makes men fancy places, traces, and spaces, though these things consist only in the truth of relations, and not at all in any absolute reality. To sum up, my conclusions are as follows. Newton's relative spaces are not global reference frames, as absolute space is; rather they are localized pockets of space, endowed with movability. They are more nearly analogous to 19 General relativity, of course, presents challenges of a wholly different order. But I think it is not impossible for a Leibnizian approach to the theory of gravitation to have some success. Noteworthy in this regard is Roger Penrose's approach to the construction of space, whose Leibnizian inspiration is duly acknowledged. material bodies, which are endowed with the additional properties of impenetrability and perceptibility. Newton's concept of absolute space corresponds to his conception of inertia as an internal force; even though there is no criterion among the phenomena for distinguishing inertial motions from rest with respect to absolute space, they are distinguished in fact by the differing corresponding internal forces. Finally, Newton's much-touted argument against the relativity of space to body is a petitio principii, depending on his own concept of relative space. Accordingly, whilst Newton's argument for the necessity of what we now call the fibration of spacetime is perfectly correct, it is not sufficient to justify Newton's view that a pre-existing spacetime with this structure must be assumed prior to matter. For Leibniz, on the other hand, a space defined in terms of relations to actually existing bodies is necessarily instantaneous because of the unceasing motions and changing relations of all the parts of matter with respect to which they are determined. This corresponds with Leibniz's philosophy of motion: all that is real in the motion of a body is an endeavour to change its relations with all others according to certain laws. One can hypothesize certain bodies as being at rest in order to represent motions, but all such hypotheses are strictly speaking equally valid. In practice one can distinguish true from apparent motions by appeal to the most intelligible hypothesis, but this does not yield a dynamical criterion in the post-Newtonian sense, so that Leibniz failed to see that Newton's argument for the absoluteness of circular motion was correct. Nevertheless, Leibniz still allowed for the construction of Newton's continuous mathematical space by a process of abstraction from the situations of bodies, where one may 'feign' the existence of fixed reference bodies and calculate positions of other bodies with respect to them by assuming the laws of motion; and on this construction (assuming we build in the correct transformation laws to replace Leibniz's universal relativity), a complete mathematical representation of trajectories and motions seems perfectly feasible.
Assuming the success of this construction, then, my final conclusion is that Leibniz's approach to space is to be preferred just because it does not hypostatize the mathematical. Space has an affine connection connecting the same places through time not because material objects are created out of chunks of space with this structure, as Newton would have it, but because sameness of place through time is defined in terms of situations of bodies and the laws of motion.
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